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2015) which is more on testing a perception, or compe-
tency practices (e.g. Reeb & Zhao, 2013). Building on this 
research gap, this research aims to empirically investigate 
the effect of those board competencies on organization ef-
ficiency, especially, the banking industry.
The main rationale of this research lays on the contes-
tation between human capital theory and agency theory. 
Board capital, the human capital/competency of board 
of directors, is important to shareholders because they 
have few options for poor decision-making consequence 
due to limited ability or skill. However, choosing capable 
directors in a congested labour market is hard to do as 
there is no consensus as to which type of capabilities fit 
the organization’s needs (Dalton et al., 1998; Rosenbusch 
et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2011). In contrast, the legal sys-
tem relatively supports and safeguards the incapability of 
directors, and shareholders-government hardly sues or 
prosecutes directors for board errors due to misconduct 
or conflict of interest (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2006).
In the context of banking industry, the competency 
needed is set even higher. This is due to the different 
banks’ nature of business from other industries. Empiri-
cal findings such as Liao et al., (2007) show how com-
petency management needed in bank is different from 
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Abstract. This study investigates the role of board capital on bank’s efficiency for a sample of 45 banks in Vietnam over 
2011–2015. Using robust panel regression, we find board capital is important in making Vietnamese bank efficient even 
after controlling its endogeneity issue. This study further documents that networking capital and experience capital are the 
important factors, but not education for bank efficiency. The findings of this research contribute to the entrenchment hy-
pothesis in agency theory, where networking and experience can be the bargaining power for manager (agent) in securing 
their compensation. It also contributes to human capital theory and resource base view theory where it shows network-
ing and experience are stratetic human capital resources for bank efficiency. The findings imply that shareholders should 
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intervention of corporate governance monitoring or test it in other developing countries context.
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Introduction 
Does directors’ competency affect organization efficiency? 
Surprisingly, there is little evidence about the answer to 
this question as it is rarely found empirical research about 
the relationship between directors’ competency and organ-
ization effectiveness. Most research emphasizes on the role 
economies of scale of a firm on organization efficiency, for 
example, the effect of capital structure (Margaritis & Psil-
laki, 2007), size (Moutsianas & Kosmidou, 2016), financial 
network (Silva et al., 2016), or income (Alhassan, 2015). 
This is quite intriguing considering Basel Accord III of 
BIS regulation and Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 address the 
importance of board competency in consolidating bank-
firm performance. Empirical research supports this notion 
by documenting the benefit of financial knowledge and 
expertise for the organization’s contingency (e.g., Kara-
manou & Vafeas, 2005; Kim et al., 2014).  
Theoretically, the seminal proposition of “Human Cap-
ital Theory” from Becker (1964) suggests the productivity 
of director depends on a broad range of human capital 
attributes. Intriguingly, economics and management lit-
eratures have primarily centered on the agency issue such 
as the incentives as the key factor of productivity. If any, 
it is more on survey research design (e.g. Harris et al., 
